News University researchers tout using smartwatches to steal data from air-gapped systems — SmartAttack paper proposes using wearable as a covert ultras...

This makes me think of a similar research finding a few years ago that used the EMI signature of DRAM. I think they set the DRAM clock to 2.4GHz (WiFi lower band) and made precise DRAM reads to create modulated RF. The signal was readable by a WiFi system across the room but I don't remember how far they were able to get.
 
Audio based exfil for airgapped systems is not in the slightest bit new. The smartwatch bit is a fairly quixotic twist: any environment that demands you remove your smartphone before entering will apply the same rule to smartwatches, and if there are no personal device controls then anyone with a smartwatch will also be carrying a smartphone too, and smartphones have a much larger attack surface to potentially compromise if you need to use an existing device to exfil rather than inserting a dedicated device (for audio exfil, that would be any compact audio recorder).